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Building the New Europe: Western and eastern roads to social partnership 
Elena Iankova and Lowell Turner 
 
It is not the countries that have reduced social spending most or minimized social partnerships 
that are the leading successes today . . . It  is therefore not the flexibility of the market, but the 
existence and adaptability of institutions and regulations which explain success . . . The special 
European way of dealing with change, filtering it through established labour market 
institutions, leads to positive results. In other words, the baby (institutions) was kept and the 
water (inefficiencies in the institutions) was at least partially thrown out. This accounts for a 
large part of European success. Peter Auer (2000, pp. 2–3) 
 
Praised by some, feared by others, neoliberal economic ideas and policies have risen to 
prominence in Europe over the past two decades. From the extremism of Margaret Thatcher to 
the more muted conservatism of Helmut Kohl to the current Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), free market ideas have challenged the social market with deregulation and policies of 
fiscal and monetary austerity. A spectre is haunting Europe: the spectre of Americanisation. 
The post-cold war, EMU-oriented ‘New Europe’ is nonetheless a social Europe, 
defending, adapting and modernising an essential social dimension within the developing 
European project. Just as the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’ dramatically demonstrated the growing 
salience even in North America of social dimension debates in an expanding global economy, so 
does the much more developed European social dimension offer examples of appropriate 
economic and social policies for integrated markets. Europe can play this forerunner role in 
today’s global economy, we argue, because of longstanding relations of social partnership, in 
which organised interests, especially business and labour, participate in regularised bargaining 
processes to craft economic and social policy compromises. Theories of decline—declining 
unions, corporatism, social democracy, Swedish model, German model, European social model, 
ad infinitum—notwithstanding, social partnership and the social market economy are alive and 
well especially in western Europe, adapting and developing in new ways even in eastern 
Europe, in spite of and alongside the rise of Anglo-American neoliberal economic policy. 
While the ways in which neoliberalism and economic integration undermine social 
partnership and the welfare state have been extensively studied, less attention has been given 
to the ways in which such economic forces may push actors together, in reinvigorated  
bargaining relationships, to find workable solutions to difficult problems. In his article, we 
examine the contemporary status of social partnership in four case study countries—Germany, 
the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Poland—as well as for Europe as a whole. In the west, while 
Germany presents a case of established social partnership under pressure, the United Kingdom 
has stood over the past two decades on the opposite neoliberal side. In the east, Bulgaria is one 
of the more developed cases of post-communist tripartism, while Poland exemplifies a weaker 
tripartism that emerged at a later stage of the transformation process. In selecting more and 
less developed social partnership cases in both west and east, we test the argument that the 
rise of Thatcher/Reagan/Friedman ‘free market economics’ is paradoxically driving a resurgence 
and consolidation of social partnership relations across the new (both western and eastern) 
Europe. 
Social Partnership and the Free Market Challenge 
Social partnership can be defined as regularised bargaining relationships between 
organised business and labour, often tripartite (with the state playing more or less engaged 
roles), to set basic wage and employment standards as well as to influence broader economic 
and social policy. The focus here on social partnership targets an important institutional and 
procedural component of the social dimension, while avoiding worn-out definitional debates 
about corporatism. In the consolidation or revitalisation of social partnership, we emphasise 
two separate indicators: (1) institutions, structures and actors, and (2) policy procedures. While 
policy outcomes can be significant indicators of social partnership, structures and procedures 
are the defining characteristics, with a variety of policy outcomes possible. Thus if structures 
and procedures reflect social partnership arrangements, then this we argue is social 
partnership, whether policy outcomes are Keynesian, ‘supply-side Keynesian’ (Falkner, 1999), 
austerity-oriented, monetarist, or some hybrid in between or beyond. 
The contemporary spread of freer markets, especially when guided by market 
fundamentalist ideology, does threaten to overwhelm and undermine social standards of all 
kinds. Yet if we look across Europe today, especially western Europe, side-by-side with 
deregulation, fiscal and monetary austerity, and high unemployment, we still see, certainly in 
international and comparative perspective, widespread prosperity, relative equality, substantial 
welfare states, strong labour unions, and extensive social and workplace standards. The danger, 
of course, is when governments go over to neoliberalism and unions are weak. It is reasonable, 
as many analysts do, to see national governments and the European Union as neoliberal 
advocates of EMU, and to emphasise a variety of indicators for national union decline and the 
failure of unions to move decisively to the European level. Yet this is only part of the story. 
Unions also remain strong in many European countries. In several cases, they find themselves in 
the midst of ongoing processes of modernisation and revitalisation, and from Germany to 
Ireland to Italy strongly organised unions participated in the 1990s in significant tripartite 
bargaining at national and sectoral levels, for new ‘social pacts’ and other policy compromises 
(Auer, 2000; Visser, 1999). 
In the east, the coming of markets has been closely linked to the dismantling of 
encompassing communist economic organisation and social policy. While new or reformed 
unions have reeled under the onslaught and in most eastern countries remain weak, important 
tripartite processes have nonetheless helped shape the coming of markets in eastern Europe 
(Iankova, 1998; 2002). Policy-makers in CEE had to introduce transformative policies in the 
early 1990s in the midst of a deep international recession, stagnant international trade, 
constrained capital markets, a deepening debt crisis, and hard conditions for loans and 
assistance. A strong domestic effort to preserve social peace and legitimate the actors in a 
period of regime change and economic restructuring underpinned the emergence and 
maintenance of tripartite transformative negotiations in the post-communist region. 
The ILO, World Bank, IMF, and European Union have also contributed to the 
development of tripartism. The ILO has packaged its philosophy of tripartism with practical 
expert assistance. While international lending institutions favoured neoliberal policies (fiscal 
and monetary austerity, anti-inflation policies, shock therapy) for states extricating themselves 
from state socialism, they have also supported the establishment of social dialogue among 
governments, unions, and employers. Negotiations have been broadened to include labour and 
employer federations, and IMF and World Bank missions have required the conclusion of 
national social peace agreements as a condition for granting loans. In Hungary, the World 
Bank’s Human Resources Development Program promoted the establishment of regional 
retraining centres run by a national tripartite body, the National Training Council (Hethy, 1994: 
316). In Bulgaria the 1992 revival of tripartism was closely linked to negotiations with the IMF 
(Thirkell and Tseneva, 1992). The EU’s increasing importance as a regional power, its PHARE 
Social Dialogue Project as well as eastward enlargement processes have all reinforced tripartite 
arrangements in the region. 
Seeking Social Europe 
‘Social Europe’—a theoretically vague term but also a much debated political concept—
has at its heart a collective societal effort to limit social inequality through government 
intervention, with an active role played by organised ‘social partners’ representing labour and 
business. Social Europe envisages economic success building on deep social foundations, on a 
shared belief that the fruits of capitalist enterprise should be distributed across society in 
policies of social and economic security. First and foremost a concept of comparative 
capitalism, social Europe contrasts sharply with the US model of capitalism featuring 
individualism, minimal state involvement in the economy, and adversarial relations between 
labour and business rather than dialogue and concertation (Albert, 1993). Despite the wide 
variation among European countries in terms of social policies, the gap separating them in 
particular from the United States is much wider and more significant (Wilensky, 2002). 
It is commonplace to seek social Europe in the wrong places. People look at the EU level 
and find that not enough is there. While Europe is integrating economically, neither democratic 
corporatist arrangements, strong social policy (comparable to the welfare state) nor unified 
European trade unionism appear possible at the European level. At the same time, European 
economic integration is undermining the power of national governments in a variety of areas 
including social policy, while undercutting national union bargaining strength (Streeck, 1991). 
Social Europe, it has seemed to many, is dead on arrival. 
The most important locus of social Europe, however, remains at the national level. 
While facilitating neoliberal policy reforms such as budget restraint and business tax reform, 
social partnership bargains also set the terms of implementation, defend national health 
systems, pensions and unemployment benefits, promote education and vocational training, and 
provide institutional anchors for labour unions and collective bargaining. Governments and 
social partners also expand social policy by implementing directives from the EU—on health 
and safety at the workplace, environmental regulations, new protections for ‘posted workers,’ 
limitations on working hours, new rules on gender equality in the workplace, the establishment 
of European works councils and much more. EMU and other neoliberal economic  pressures 
have arguably driven a ‘renaissance of national corporatism’ (Grote and Schmitter, 1999). 
EU-level social policy can be viewed as a significant supplement to national policy. The 
directives mentioned above are all examples of new social regulations developed with the 
active participation of European labour and business as well as national governments. Under 
pressures of economic crisis and growing international competition in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
European social space began to expand as a necessary complement to the internal market. In 
1988 the Commission added an explicit social dimension to the single market initiative. The 
strongest motivation was a mounting fear of social dumping, a potential result of increased 
regional disparities, as investment and jobs moved (it was feared) from the higher-wage north 
to the lower-cost south. 
The Single European Act (1987) set the goal of creating the internal market by 1992, and 
committed member states to harmonise workplace health and safety measures at the highest 
possible level. SEA gave the Commission responsibility for promoting dialogue between the 
social partners, to reach common positions on workplace issues, especially for the development 
of European-level collective bargaining. The Act also emphasised the need for economic and 
social cohesion to reduce regional disparities. The 1988 White Paper entitled ‘Social Dimension 
of the Internal Market’ had unemployment as its main target and proposed a series of policy 
measures (Springer, 1992). 
In 1989, after considerable debate, 11 of the 12 member nations adopted a Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. While this ‘Social Charter’ was adopted as a declaration, 
without the force of law, a path-breaking linkage was established for the Community between 
social policy and human rights. The Treaty on European Union (the ‘Maastricht Treaty’ ratified 
in 1993) essentially adopted the Social Charter as the 14th Protocol to the Treaty (the ‘Social 
Protocol’), including an agreement on social policy. The Treaty restated the objectives of social 
policy—the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, proper social 
protection, dialogue between management and labour, and the development of human 
resources with a view to achieving durable high employment and combating discrimination. 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 incorporated the Social Protocol into the body of the Treaty. 
Although the role of European institutions and legislation in the field of social policy remains 
limited (Archer and Butler, 1996; Tsoukalis, 1997), significant first steps have been taken, with 
more sure to follow as the new EU Constitution comes into play and the European Parliament 
and other institutions are strengthened. 
Social dialogue at the European level, in spite of the limitations, has scored some real 
achievements. New EU directives have forced changes in national laws that strengthened social 
policy (from working hours in the UK to gender equality in Germany). Millions of EU citizens are 
benefiting from expanded parental leave and improved rights for part-time workers as a result 
of agreements negotiated between the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations in 
Europe (UNICE) and the ETUC. As integration proceeds, the emergence of a ‘corporatist policy 
community’ becomes increasingly plausible (Falkner, 1998), not one that displaces national 
level social partnerships but one that complements them. 
For the east, social Europe is an important catalyst for the harmonisation of domestic 
legislation with European common law, the acquis communautaire, in the area of national 
social dialogue. Accession institutions (association councils, association committees, and joint 
parliamentary committees) have developed as joint bodies between the EU and each applicant 
country. Trans-European networks involving the EU’s political parties and other social groups, 
with their respective counterparts in the applicant countries, are another means for integrating 
the post-communist countries into Europe’s socio-political structures. 
The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Economic and Social 
Committee (ECOSOC) of the EU, for example, have organised meetings and hearings in Brussels, 
Warsaw, Tallinn and elsewhere to enable applicant countries’ social and economic  
organisations to voice their opinions. With support from the European Commission, ECOSOC 
organised a major conference in 1999 that brought together 93 social partner representatives 
from the EU with 80 from the applicant countries to discuss the role of social partners in 
enlargement and accession processes, emphasising the development of social dialogue 
structures and activities in the applicant countries. 
Trade unions from western Europe, united in the ETUC, have developed a policy of 
active cooperation with ETUC member unions in the CEE applicant countries. With support 
from an ETUC standing committee on integration, western unions have helped their 
counterparts in the applicant countries set up standing committees on European integration, 
with specialised working groups to influence their own governments with union views on 
accession. 
ECOSOC has also forged and consolidated bilateral links with groups from the applicant 
countries, in joint consultative committees on economic and social issues. Such committees—
first created in Hungary (1997) and Bulgaria (1999)—included representatives of ECOSOC as 
well as economic and social interest groups in CEE applicants. Committee members represent 
employers, unions, farmers, consumers, and women, and have paved the way for enlargement 
by promoting domestic dialogue as well as cooperation between economic and social interest 
groups in the EU and CEE. 
Western Europe: Social Partnership and Welfare State Reform 
Writing about labour market successes of the 1990s in Austria, Denmark, Ireland and 
the Netherlands, Peter Auer (2000) makes a persuasive case based on extensive comparative 
research: social partnerships in western Europe, their institutions and processes, have 
promoted successful economic reform and defended labour market and social policy. If western 
European nations have had to make concessions to neoliberal economic policy in present 
European and global markets, they have done so in ways that mitigate negative effects while 
reconsolidating relations of social partnership and the inclusion of organised labour. 
 Jelle Visser makes a similar but broader argument that includes Auer’s four countries as 
well as Italy, Portugal, Spain, Finland – and in a more germinal way Germany and Belgium. He 
argues: ‘One of the interesting phenomena of recent years is the resurgence of a national social 
dialogue between labor unions, employers’ associations and governments in many European 
countries’ (Visser, 1999, p. 4). In this analysis, a new generation of social pacts is driven by the 
need to meet EMU convergence criteria, and made possible by past learning on the part of 
governments, employers and unions concerning the dangers of unilateral action and the 
positive gains to be made through social dialogue. 
 Along with the flowering of social pacts comes a flowering of the literature, itself 
indicative of a growing awareness on the part of academics and policy makers of the continuing 
salience of social partnership. Recent books and articles on western Europe have titles such as: 
‘The Renaissance of National Corporatism’ (Grote and Schmitter, 1999), ‘EU Social Policy in the 
1990s: Towards a Corporatist Policy Community’ (Falkner, 1998), ‘The Resurgence of Italian 
Unions?’ (Locke and Baccaro, 1999), ‘Fighting for Partnership’ (Turner, 1998), ‘Employment 
Revival in Europe’ (Auer, 2000), and ‘The Revival of Social Dialogue in Europe’ (Visser, 1999). 
 Neoliberal economic policy in its purest forms promotes deregulation and the 
dismantling of institutions, clearing away barriers to free market outcomes such as strong 
unions, collective bargaining and government regulation. While policies of fiscal and monetary 
restraint were widely implemented in the run-up to EMU, with painful effects such as high 
unemployment, such policies were often agreed upon and implemented in processes of social 
dialogue. Negative effects were mitigated through collective bargaining as well as the policies 
of still extensive welfare states (including national health care, universal education and training 
and substantial unemployment insurance). 
 Institutions and procedures of social partnership thus remain central to the political 
economies of most west European countries. At the same time, policy outcomes, driven in 
neoliberal directions by European and global markets, nonetheless continue to incorporate 
strong labour and social standards. Free market economics, in other words, far from 
dismantling social partnership in western Europe, is paradoxically driving (and has been 
tempered by) social pacts, dialogue and partnership negotiations. 
 While the social dimension at the European level is by no means insignificant, the 
consolidation of social partnership in this neoliberal era has occurred most prominently at the 
national level. Above we have mentioned a range of countries studied by Auer and Visser. Here, 
as additional evidence, we present the cases of two large western European countries, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, the first a leader in postwar social partnership relations, the 
latter a laggard even before the Thatcher onslaught. 
 
 
Germany: modernizing the social market 
With all the agonising over unification and subsequent economic problems and current 
debates on economic policy reform, German employer associations and unions continue to play 
instrumental roles not only in comprehensive collective bargaining but in a wide variety of 
policy reform discussions, formal and informal. For every concession to fiscal austerity and EMU 
convergence criteria, there are also demonstrations of the continuing prominence of social 
partnership in regulating the changes. And in any case strict monetary policy has always been a 
feature of the German Federal Republic. 
German employer associations and unions, although neither are as comprehensive as 
they once were, remain deeply engaged in policy debates and negotiations as well as collective 
bargaining. Although tempted by the ‘siren song of deregulation’ (Allen, 1998) and weakened 
by defections, German employers as a whole cannot bring themselves either to attack or to 
withdraw from their close social partnership relations with the unions (Thelen, 2000). While 
German unions have lost membership density over the past decade (now under 30 per cent), 
they remain powerful in the capacity to set wage standards for the entire economy as well as to 
mobilise the workforce in widespread job actions when necessary (Thelen, 2001; Turner, 1998). 
German unification, formalised in 1990 but still an ongoing process, presented a massive 
challenge to the social market economy. While the financing necessary to make unification 
work (transfers averaging $100 billion/year from west to east throughout the 1990s) has limited 
other welfare state expenditures and raised taxes, policy compromises have often emerged in 
tripartite negotiation. The recently renewed Solidarity Pact of 1993, for example, a set of 
economic and social policies for eastern Germany, was agreed in negotiations including federal 
and state governments, employer associations and unions (Sally and Webber, 1994). 
Policy outcomes have been mixed. Unemployment remains high and chronic, especially 
in eastern Germany. Yet wages remain high, prosperity is widespread, and no one talks 
seriously of cutting back comprehensive welfare state policies such as health care, education 
and vocational training. Bargaining among social partners continues to influence policy 
direction, incorporating neoliberal elements viewed as necessary by policy makers while 
defending and modernising key elements of the welfare state and social market economy. 
The biggest problem for a strong German social model, at the core of a developing social 
Europe, may be the long-term viability of cohesive interest groups. Kathleen Thelen has 
effectively shown why German employers on the whole stay together and remain committed to 
social partnership (Thelen, 2000; Thelen and Kume, 1999). Others have shown the continuing 
strength of German unions, even in the face of extraordinary challenges (e.g., Turner, 1998). 
We believe that the latter is decisive in the German case (and that an excess of firm-centrism is 
an important flaw in an otherwise insightful ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature; Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Simply put, in Germany as in other countries, weak unions encourage employers to 
defect while strong unions push employers together for mutual support. The problem is that 
German unions face new challenges, potentially serious, which they have not yet faced in a full 
way. 
Even with strong institutions and the proven capacity to strike with solidarity and 
enthusiasm, union membership levels are on the decline. While unions have remained 
influential in German society thanks to entrenched institutional position backed by mobilisation 
capacity, declining numbers over time can only mean declining influence. Institutional position 
can be defended only so long in circumstances of continuing organisational erosion. 
The problem now is that while unions remain powerful in their strongholds, they are 
weak in their capacity to organise growing groups in the workforce such as women, the young, 
and white-collar workers. Yet German unions still do not have well developed, widely accepted 
strategies to organise the unorganised. They recognise the problem, discuss it widely, write 
articles and position papers, hold conferences. On a broad scale, however, they have not yet 
moved beyond rather traditional approaches: exhorting shop stewards and works councillors to 
sign up the non-members in their workplaces; offering incentives to members to sign up 
colleagues; and exploiting situations of conflict (in collective bargaining or other job actions) to 
bring in new members. None of these time-tested strategies, however, appear adequate to the 
current challenges: to push toward major breakthroughs in organising new groups of workers 
such as women and youth. 
German unions are strong because of their institutional position in the social market 
economy and because they have continually renewed the commitment of members and works 
councillors in rank-and-file mobilisations (including warning strikes). As a result, German unions 
are so solidly positioned within the political economy that the urgent need for new organising 
strategies may go unmet. Against the potential turbulence that a shift toward fuller rank-and-
file mobilisation may bring, the institutional conservatism of the still powerful prevails. 
We do not however join the doomsayers regarding the future of German unions. 
Institutional anchors and the capacity for viable collective bargaining compromise remain 
impressive. If and when German union leaders decide to organise the unorganised and to 
negotiate substantial economic policy reform, they have impressive resources at their disposal. 
There is no reason to think that at some point they will not do this, under rising economic and 
political pressure including membership demands. 
In the meantime, the German social market economy remains a strong base from which 
to continue building a social Europe. Social partnership here reinforces the  possibilities for 
social partnership elsewhere—just as developing weaknesses here are problematic for Europe 
as a whole. 
United Kingdom: from neoliberal stronghold to soft social partnership? 
If Germany is the large European country with the strongest social partnership tradition, 
the United Kingdom is clearly the weakest case. For most western European countries, it is the 
pressures of EMU plus the previous existence of social dialogue among social partners that 
together have made the reconsolidation of social partnership bargaining a likely outcome 
(Visser, 1999). In the UK, by contrast, the absence of such institutions and practices has meant 
that other factors have combined with neoliberal economic pressures to produce a new 
(although still limited) interest in European-style social partnership. These factors include the 
following. 
First, disillusionment throughout the 1990s with (and arguably the barrenness of) 
Thatcher/Major economic and social policies generated a widespread desire to move beyond 
market solutions alone. This is the perspective that Tony Blair and the Labour Party rode 
successfully to landslide election victories in 1997 and 2001. Second, the Blair government itself 
has actively promoted a limited version of social partnership, seeking to bring traditionally 
adversarial labour and management together around policies of economic growth, labour 
market flexibility and union moderation. 
Third, European influence has had an important effect. While Margaret Thatcher 
derided social partnership as old fashioned continental socialism, Tony Blair has moved the UK 
closer to Europe, fulfilling a campaign promise by eliminating Britain’s opt-out on the 
Maastricht Social Protocol. The Blair government has openly praised European-style social 
partnerships, while large British employers have negotiated  new European works councils and 
sought better relations with their unions. And the European influence has pushed some British 
unions toward an acceptance of social partnership, at firm, industry and national levels. 
Fourth, therefore, British unions, traditionally adversarial and committed to 
voluntarism, reassessed their strategic orientation in the wake of serious decline at the hands 
of Margaret Thatcher and her anti-union policies (dropping from 54 to 30 per cent union 
membership density from 1979 to 1997). ‘New Unionism,’ promoted by the TUC, advocates 
social partner relations with employers while at the same time stepping up active recruitment 
and organising efforts. The Labour government’s Employment Relations Act of 1999 promotes 
both partnership and representation in ways that support union efforts (Heery et al., 2001). 
Unlike Germany, the UK has neither an institutional base for social partnership nor 
established bargaining procedures for policy making. Barriers to reform include not only a 
tradition of voluntarist ideology and practice, but highly decentralised business and labour 
organisation. On the business side, interest in social partnership is by and large limited to the 
firm level, with general opposition to broader industry or national level initiatives. British labour 
remains decentralised in its bargaining and coverage efforts. At the same time, several unions 
have merged over the past decade into ‘super unions,’ seeking to combine the strengths of 
traditional decentralization with stronger central capacities. The new super unions, combined 
with the apparent recent reversal of union decline in the UK, could conceivably lay the 
institutional groundwork for a developing British version of social partnership (Heery et al., 
1998). The election in 2003 of more militant leadership at two of the largest unions (TGWU and 
GMB) may paradoxically reinforce this prospect, if the unions are strengthened while 
employers and Labour government are shaken up by the new militance. 
As in the German case, we believe that the decisive actor here may well be organised 
labour (again in opposition to a rather stifling de-emphasis on labor as an independent actor in 
the ‘varieties’ literature). If unions can use their own internal reforms as well as new legislation 
to stabilize or even push union membership levels upward, a stronger foundation can be built 
for British social partners to meet as equals in expanded bargaining. If the unions can do this, 
even in a context of rising industrial conflict and anti-privatisation mobilisation – or because of 
these – the push for  European-style inclusion at firm, industry and even national levels (much 
of it informal and behind the scenes) can be expected to persist. 
Critical to this process is the unresolved tension between social partnership, organising 
and militance inside the labour movement. A radical break with British labour’s adversarial 
past, the social partnership approach seeks to rebuild unions through good relationships with 
business leaders via win-win bargaining and a new understanding of the realities of competition 
in the global economy. The social partnership approach aims at nothing less than to (1) bring 
Britain more fully into the European Union, (2) raise both productivity and wages while giving 
employers less cause to oppose union recognition, and (3) improve the British economy while 
strengthening the unions. 
It is unlikely, however, that social partnership efforts along with new legislation will be 
enough to revitalise the British labour movement. For partnership to work from a labour point 
of view, unions must be strong, capable if necessary of widespread rank-and-file mobilisation 
(as the German case demonstrates). And for the new legislationto mean anything, unions must 
use it actively to organise the unorganised. A central element of the TUC’s New Unionism is a 
commitment to organise new members, for ‘in-fill’ as well as in new organising, directed at non-
union workplaces in service industries, electronics and other places where union presence is 
weak (Heery et al., 1998). 
The commitment to organising as well as renewed militance point toward a 
strengthened rank-and-file unionism. That the advocates of social partnership, organising and 
militance are often quite opposed in ideological and practical orientations (expressed at times 
in vociferous debate) does nothing to diminish the fact that for the revitalisation of the British 
labour movement they may well be necessary complements. The prospects for a British-style 
social partnership depend very much on future union strategy and the surprising but now very 
real possibility of renewed union strength. 
Eastern Europe: The Coming of Markets and Social Partnership 
 Most of the formerly communist countries, very early in their transitions, approached 
the coming of markets in part by reviving collective bargaining and using tripartite forums for 
social dialogue among the state, trade unions, and emerging employers at both national and 
subnational levels (Iankova, 1998, 2000). Tripartism was to balance the dynamic conflicts 
between the public interest in transforming the old social order and a variety of group and 
individual interests in keeping wages and living standards at acceptable levels. By legitimating 
the new ‘social partners’ and giving them voice in the direction of change and distribution of 
the burdens of transformation, tripartite forums helped to prevent eruptions of industrial and 
social discontent in the difficult early years of economic reform, thereby facilitating the building 
of a new capitalist order with a minimum of social unrest. 
 Post-communist tripartism was most manifest in two major areas. Given its wide 
acceptance as a means to distribute the social burden of restructuring across the population, 
tripartism played a prominent role in deciding distributional issues such as wages, incomes, and 
social and employment policies. And tripartism also played an important role in 
democratisation, since the deepening of political democracy depends on access to the policy-
making process by groups representing the interests of different sections of society. 
Here we present evidence of emerging social partnership structures and procedures in 
the post-communist region, focusing on two countries in particular—Bulgaria and Poland. 
While each developed tripartite institutions in the aftermath of the 1989 breakthrough, the 
contrasting legacies of their extrication paths, along with differing levels of social partner 
commitment to social dialogue, account for notable variation in the timing, organisational 
structure and bargaining patterns of tripartism. 
Bulgaria: post-communist restructuring and tripartism 
 After the collapse of the Zhivkov regime in November 1989, the clandestine trade union 
Podkrepa, formed in February 1989, emerged into the open while existing unions experienced a 
steady decrease in membership. To gain political legitimacy and to prove itself capable of 
defending member interests in the transition to a market economy, the old unions—
reconstituted as the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB)—initiated 
negotiations and regular consultations with the Lukanov government. For its part, the 
government sought public negotiations with the unions political legitimacy in the face of 
consolidating democratic opposition. Podkrepa joined the bargaining forum in April 1990, 
moving from a primarily political stance toward a more traditional union orientation for the 
defense of member economic interests. 
 Social dialogue facilitated the emergence and legitimation of more distinct employer 
organisations, as employers came under pressure from other actors, especially trade unions. 
Thus the National Union of Economic Managers (NUEM) was formed in January 1990 with the 
assistance of the CITUB (Petkov and Gradev, 1995). The Bulgarian Industrial Association (BIA) 
and Chamber of Commerce, as well as two more employer organisations—the Union of Private 
Economic Enterprises and the Vazrazhdane Union of Private Entrepreneurs (both founded in 
December 1989)—became partners in the social dialogue. 
The most important accomplishments of the emerging national tripartism included: the 
Law on the Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes (adopted by the Grand National Assembly in 
March 1990); the signing of a general agreement on urgent social and economic problems, 
between the government, CITUB and NUEM (March 1990); and the adoption by the social 
partners of General Guidelines for the  Conclusion of Collective Contracts and Agreements 
During 1990 (April 1990). The creation on April 5, 1990, of a National Commission for 
Coordination of Interests marked the institutionalisation of social dialogue in Bulgaria. 
Social partnership relations were suspended in late 1991 by the newly formed neoliberal 
government of the Union of Democratic Forces. Following strong pressure from unions and 
international organisations, however, this government established a new social dialogue body, 
the National Council for Social Partnership, in May 1992. Finally in early 1993, the National 
Council for Tripartite Cooperation was formed following adoption of a new Labor Code that 
made social dialogue mandatory. 
The National Council continues its work to the present day, focusing much of its 
attention on wages. The social partners have to agree on the national minimum wage and other 
protected payments—such as monthly additional child allowances and unemployment 
benefits—which are calculated as a percentage of the minimum wage. The social partners also 
negotiate wage increases and protection against inflation for both the public sector and for 
state enterprises in manufacturing. Strategies and policies in the area of employment and 
unemployment are also regularly discussed by the Tripartite Council, and important laws and 
normative documents eventually issued by the government often have been prepared by the 
Council. The goals, principles, criteria and mechanisms of incomes policy have also been major 
areas of discussions within the tripartite forum. Discussions have included the formation, 
regulation and indexation of wages in manufacturing and the public sector, indexation of 
pensions, unemployment payments, minimum wage, social aid and child allowances. Most 
aspects of the economic reforms were also discussed in the Council. These included price 
controls on selected basic goods; legislation concerning the financing of small and medium 
enterprise development; privatisation and industrial restructuring; and health insurance. 
As the economy deteriorated sharply in 1996 as a result of mismanagement by the 
Socialist Videnov government, social dialogue within the National Council was discontinued. 
Massive protest actions and strikes across the country in December 1996 and January 1997 led 
to the resignation of the government and to early parliamenttary elections in April 1997. With 
the formation of the Kostov cabinet (Union of Democratic Forces) in May 1997, social dialogue 
was quickly restored. The introduction of a currency board in July at the insistence of the IMF 
stabilized the Bulgarian currency, but challenged the government and the social partners to 
work closely with the international financial institutions which in effect became part of the 
revised social dialogue system. Under the terms of a Charter for Social Cooperation and 
Memorandum for Priority Common Action (signed in October 1997 between the prime minister 
and the social partners), the unions agreed to support the Currency Board on the 
understanding that social dialogue would deepen. The Charter for Social Cooperation aimed to 
mobilise a broad social consensus for ongoing economic and social reforms and to promote 
democratisation. The goal was to bring social dialogue to ‘European standards,’ especially after 
Bulgaria became an official candidate for EU membership in 1996 and had to harmonize and 
comply with the acquis communautaire as a precondition for entry. As part of the accession 
effort, Bulgaria is expected by the EU to develop and maintain autonomous social dialogue 
among the social partners. 
In 1998–99 a series of laws brought Bulgarian legislation in the social sphere largely in 
line with European laws, and created seven other tripartite organs to complement the activities 
of the National Council for Tripartite Cooperation and deal with social insurance, employment, 
vocational training, social assistance, work conditions, and the rehabilitation and social 
integration of disabled people. Five specialised social funds, each governed with the broad 
participation of the social partners, were established for social security, vocational training and 
unemployment, working conditions, social assistance, and rehabilitation and social integration. 
With progress in social, economic and political restructuring in the 1990s the 
importance of tripartism gradually decreased. Anticipated EU accession, however, has given 
new impetus to the maintenance of social dialogue in Bulgaria—including the estasblishment of 
a new tripartite Economic and Social Council in accordance with general European practices and 
standards and more specific EU accession requirements. 
Poland: from ethical truce to institutionalized tripartism 
 Poland was the first country in the Soviet bloc to break from communist rule, and it did 
so in processes of negotiation and compromise. Yet after the collapse of the regime, Poland, 
unlike any other country in the region, did not develop institutionalised ‘social peace’ tripartism 
for several years, until early 1994. The reason lies not so much in Poland’s deep embrace of 
neoliberal reform and interest-based politics. The popularity of neoliberal ideas was present 
not only in Poland but all over the region, as a natural move towards the market. What made 
the Polish tripartite  scenario especially problematic was the complex interweaving of 
neoliberal and  interest-based politics with the unique ethics-based politics found in Poland. 
 In the post-1989 era, Poland’s political system was dominated by the Solidarity 
movement, not by parties (Millard, 1994). With its commitment to spontaneity and informality, 
Poland’s ethical civil society (Linz and Stepan, 1996) prevented Poland from embracing in 1989–
91 a formal tripartite arrangement for the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms. Poland 
did not need to develop specialised tripartite arrangements to guarantee social peace. The high 
political and moral consensus developed prior to the election of 1989 could be radically and 
successfully mobilised to produce broad approval for the implementation of the ‘shock therapy’ 
plan of Finance Minister Balcerowicz beginning in January 1990. 
 Reflecting the ethical bonds of Poland’s civil society, informal social partnership 
arrangements found expression in Poland’s parliament, and in bargaining between the 
government, labour unions (especially Solidarity), and emerging employers (notably the 
Confederation of Polish Employers, KPP). To combat the most acute problem of economic 
reform, namely unemployment, a national system of tripartite employment councils was 
established early in the 1990s. However, despite Solidarity’s efforts to lobby directly in 
parliament and in informal talks with the government for social mechanisms to counterbalance 
neoliberal reforms, the considerable losses in real income quickly undermined the socio-
political consensus for radical change and provoked substantial unrest among the population. 
The strike wave in the summer of 1992 marked an important step in the erosion of consensus 
at the top of the Polish polity. A more formal and inclusive mechanism was needed to limit 
mass discontent and guarantee continuation of economic reforms. 
The Suchocka government and, in particular, the Minister of Labor, Jacek Kuron, 
proposed negotiations to develop a social pact—the Enterprise Pact. The government’s main 
intention was to grant effective guarantees of minimum security in return for the continuation 
of reforms and privatisation. The Pact on State Enterprises in Transformation was signed on 22 
February 1993, in three versions: with Solidarity, with the All-Poland Trade Union Alliance 
(OPZZ), and with seven branch unions. In return for union acceptance of the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises, workers were granted important concessions: they would help 
determine their enterprise’s  privatisation strategy, they would receive 10 per cent of their 
enterprise’s stock, and union representatives would sit on the boards of newly privatised 
companies. 
The government expected the 1991 Trade Union Act and the collective bargaining 
aspects of the Enterprise Pact to discourage labour disputes, but the austerity of economic 
reforms and the absence of a stable process for resolving disputes increased tensions on the 
shopfloor in 1993, and many strikes occurred before the Enterprise Pact legislation could be 
passed. The dissolution of Parliament in 1993, almost immediately after the successful 
negotiation of the Pact, was clear evidence of the fragile balance of Poland’s tripartite 
compromise. 
The functions of the Tripartite Commission on Socio-Economic Issues envisaged in the 
Enterprise Pact were laid out in a government decree in February 1994. The signatories of the 
Enterprise Pact automatically became members of the Commission. The Commission was 
established to monitor economic processes and basic macroeconomic relations and to 
formulate social and economic policy proposals. The latter included public sector employment 
policy; social benefits; and the relation between consumption and investment. 
The most noteworthy function of the Tripartite Commission is to set target maxima for 
wage increases in public and private sector enterprises employing over 50 persons. The Law of 
16 December 1994 on the establishment of a new national collective bargaining system 
abolished the popiwek, a punitive tax of up to 100 per cent on all wage increases above wage 
norms, linked to a government ‘inflation coefficient’ set for certain state firms. The new system, 
in effect since 1995, represented ‘a turning point in the relations between government, 
employers and unions’ (Kabaj, 1998: 241). In July of each year, the government provides the 
Commission with projected macroeconomic indicators for the following year on real GDP 
growth, inflation, and the proposed maximum annual increase in average monthly wages. By 31 
August, the Commission is required to determine the maximum annual increase in average 
monthly wages and approximate indicators for each quarter relative to the same period of the 
previous year. The target maxima set by the Tripartite Commission have an important influence 
in enterprise bargaining over wage increases, alongside the financial situation of the firm 
(Kabaj, 1998: 241). 
General elections in 1997 returned to government the post-Solidarity parties, grouped 
under the AWS umbrella. While the right-wing coalition government of Jerzy Buzek proved 
determinedly neoliberal, accelerated EU accession processes along with Poland’s eagerness to 
become a member of the EU soon pushed this reluctant government towards maintaining an 
established social dialogue that incorporated increasingly autonomous social partners, as 
preconditions for EU membership. 
To conclude, the specific Polish variant of post-communist tripartism rested on close 
contacts between Solidarity unions and governments. Guided by the ethos and historical 
symbolism of the broad Solidarity movement, Poland had less need than its neighbours to 
develop ‘social peace’ cooperation and tripartism for legitimation purposes with the coming of 
neoliberal reform. With deteriorating living standards, however, the crystallisation of more 
distinct economic interests was institutionalized in tripartite conciliation by 1994. With 
anticipated EU accession, Poland like Bulgaria is committed to maintaining and developing 
tripartite structures at the heart of its socio-political system. 
Conclusions 
 In its struggle for new identity following the collapse of state socialism in 1989, in a 
context of rapidly expanding global markets, the New Europe, in different ways both east and 
west, has turned to institutions of social partnership for regulation and  legitimacy. The 
challenge has been to make social partnership flexible enough for the unpredictable demands 
of open markets. 
In the west, the process has been straightforward if somewhat surprising, especially for 
the many theorists of union and corporatist decline. Starting in the early 1990s, a resurgence of 
social partnership negotiations across western Europe has in fact been driven to a large extent 
by neoliberal economic policies initiated at the European level. The deepening of European 
integration with the creation of EMU has provided new incentives for negotiated solutions, 
from Denmark and Ireland to Spain and Italy, and even in a partnership laggard like the United 
Kingdom. 
In the east, the neoliberal return to the market and in particular the establishment of 
labour markets and the need to preserve social peace in times of uncertainty have pushed post-
communist governments from all-encompassing economic regulation towards policies aimed at 
creating viable collective bargaining institutions, initially for the most part tripartite in character 
with continuing state involvement in the economy. The international lending community, 
despite its distinct neoliberal identity, has also advised CEE governments to maintain social 
dialogue with interest groups as a condition for loans and the preservation of social peace. This 
short-term, transformationdriven generator of tripartism across the region was consolidated on 
a more permanent basis in the EU accession process. The launch of the EU’s ‘Social Dialogue’ 
project in the early 1990s aimed at promoting the organisational capacities of CEE’s social 
partners. The articulation in 1998 of an EU accession norm on social dialogue played an 
important role in maintaining tripartism and defending it against potential attacks by neoliberal 
governments. Tripartite institutions and arrangements, which in many countries declined in 
importance as the transformation advanced, thus gained new support as preconditions for EU 
entry in ongoing accession processes.  
This general trend in post-communist social partnership reflects the increasing 
importance of the European level in promoting social dialogue across today’s Europe. In 
countries where social actors have been generally less committed to partnership negotiation, 
such as the United Kingdom and Poland, European level policies and institutions have been 
important catalysts in promoting social partnership. In the United Kingdom, emerging social 
partnership strategies have aimed in part at bringing Britain more fully into the European 
Union. In the CEE region, especially in countries with greater commitments to neoliberalism and 
free markets such as Poland, public debates on accession have raised concerns about the 
European social model and its social-democratic policies. Yet even Balcerowicz, the prominent 
Polish architect of 1990–91 shock therapy reforms, while raising concerns about the  EU’s 
imposition of social standards in its eastward expansion, has acknowledged that such standards 
must be accepted for CEE applicants to become EU members (Balczerowicz, 1999). 
A common problem in the literature is that analysts fall into either/or, zero-sum 
perspectives. Politics against markets, markets versus social democracy, globalization or 
European integration versus the power of the nation-state, realism versus functionalism, 
centralisation versus decentralisation, wage moderation versus union strength, tripartism 
versus neoliberalism—all of these, we believe, are examples of ways in which polarised debates 
undermine clarity of analysis. Just as it is much easier to identify problems than it is to offer 
viable solutions, so is it easier to analyse crisis than to explain success. Brilliant academics have 
told us why the Wall would never come down, why American and European economies could 
not compete with the Japanese, why European integration was the beginning of the end for 
union influence. All of these predictions, and the analyses upon which they were based, have 
proven overstated if not flatly wrong. 
Chronic pessimists have also told us that the European social dimension is but window 
dressing for a neoliberal project. Yet social and labour activists involved in other processes of 
regional integration from Mercosur to NAFTA and beyond look first and foremost to the 
European Union for a model of how social and labour  standards can be developed along with 
expanded regional and international trade. While neoliberal economic policies may 
predominate today in Europe as across the global economy, the consolidation of social 
partnership structures and procedures inside western and eastern European countries—and to 
a less developed but growing extent at the EU-level as well—lays a continuing groundwork for 
interest group inclusion and future policy reform. 
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